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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1991)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
granting defendant's motion for PIP set-off and ordering that 
$3,000 be deducted from plaintiff's judgment where the jury found 
defendant to be 100% liable for causing the collision, yet awarded 
plaintiff only $4,000 of his special damages, despite a stipulation 
that plaintiff had incurred $7,815 of reasonable medical charges 
which arose out of the injuries of this collision, which 
stipulation was presented to the jury in a jury instruction to the 
effect that $7,815 had been incurred in accident related medical 
expenses? As a question of law, more particularly a question of 
statutory interpretation involving the application of Utah Code 
Annotated § 31A-22-3 09 (6), this Court accords no deference to the 
conclusions of the lower court, but rather assesses the trial 
court's conclusions for correctness. State v, Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 
786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is determinative of the question at 
issue in this appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309: 
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(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection 
coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits required under 
personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, including the Workers1 Compensation Fund of 
Utah, the insurer of the person who would be held legally 
liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the payment, 
but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; 
and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff and appellant Winton Aposhian brought this action in 
the Third Judicial District Court to recover compensation for 
injuries he sustained as a result of an automobile collision. The 
trial resulted in a jury determination that Quimby was 100% at 
fault for the collision, and that Aposhian had suffered medical 
expenses in the amount of $4,000 and general damages in the amount 
of $5,000. (R. 205-206). On or about May 6, 1993, the trial court 
granted defendant's motion for a PIP set-off of $3,000, 
representing the amount defendant was allegedly obligated to 
reimburse plaintiff's no-fault insurer, thereby allowing defendant 
to deduct this $3,000 from the amount of the jury verdict. (R. 
268-269). On or about May 7, 1993, plaintiff filed his notice of 
appeal from the trial court's ruling on the PIP set-off. (R. 272) . 
On or about September 21, 1993 the Supreme Court poured this matter 
over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. (R. unnumbered as of 
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time plaintiff filed his brief, found at penultimate page of 
record.) 
Statement of Facts and Disposition 
1. On or about November 30, 1990, the vehicle drivien by 
plaintiff Winton Aposhian was struck from the rear by a vehicle 
driven by defendant Steve Quimby. (R. 3). 
2. As a result of the collision of November 30, 1990, 
Aposhian suffered personal injuries which required medical care. 
(R. 3-4, 206). 
3. Prior to the trial of this action, the parties stipulated 
to a summary of the reasonable charges for plaintiff's medical care 
incurred as a result of the subject collision. (R. 114) . 
4. At the trial of this action, an instruction was submitted 
to the jury to the effect that the parties had stipulated to 
"$7,815 incurred in accident related medical expenses." (R. 174.) 
5. On or about February 25, 1993, the jury returned its 
verdict, finding that the defendant was 100% negligent in causing 
the collision of November 30, 1990, that plaintiff had suffered 
injury as a result of the collision, and that plaintiff had 
sustained damage to the extent of $4,000 for medical expenses and 
$5,000 in general damages as a result of the subject collision. 
(R. 205-206). 
6. On or about March 1, 1993, defendant made a post-trial 
motion for PIP set-off, claiming that he was required to pay $3,000 
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to plaintiff's no-fault insurer, representing the amount paid to 
plaintiff as no-fault benefits, (R. 213, et seq.). 
7. Following submission of a memorandum in support, in 
opposition, and in reply, and after hearing oral argument, the 
trial court granted defendant's motion, ordering that $3,000 be 
deducted from the amount of the judgment. (R. 268-269). 
8. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on or about May 7, 
1993. (R. 272). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/appellant Winton Aposhian respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the ruling of the Third District Court, honorable 
Richard Moffat presiding, ordering that the jury verdict be reduced 
by $3,000, and reinstate the full jury verdict amount of $9,000. 
The reason for this request is that the trial court erred in 
deducting a PIP set-off of $3,000 where the jury reduced the amount 
of plaintiff's stipulated reasonable medical charges incurred as a 
result of the subject collision by $3,815. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
WHERE THE PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL BILLS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REDUCED 
BY THE JURY MORE THAN $3,000 BELOW THE STIPULATED REASONABLE 
MEDICAL CHARGES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE COLLISION, NO PIP SET-
OFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED: While it is true that the generally 
accepted practice is to reduce plaintiff's award by the amount of 
the PIP payments, if plaintiff has recovered PIP payments as part 
of the jury verdict, it is equally true that no such reduction is 
proper where the plaintiff's stipulated reasonable charges incurred 
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as a result of the subject collision have been reduced more than 
$3,000 by the jury's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUBROGATION OWED BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF'S 
NO-FAULT INSURER SHOULD NOT BE DEDUCTED FROM THE 
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE VERDICT 
HAS ALREADY BEEN REDUCED PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY BY MORE 
THAN THE AMOUNT OF THE PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION PAYMENTS 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(6)(a) provides, in pertinent 
part, that "where the insured under the policy [which provides 
personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage] is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to 
whom benefits required under personal injury protection have been 
paid by another insurer,...the insurer of the person who would be 
held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment". Further, the following sub-section of U.C.A. § 31A-22-
309(6), part (b), provides that "the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding 
arbitration between the insurers." Defendant's contention before 
the trial court, which that court agreed with in granting his 
motion, is that, although the above-cited statutes provide for 
resolution of the dispute between only the insurers, the tortfeasor 
is entitled to deduct from the judgment the amount of the PIP 
subrogation if the jury was not explicitly instructed that a 
portion of plaintiff's medical bills were paid by his no-fault 
insurer. 
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But where, as in the instant case, the injured party has 
received less than the amount of his damages, particularly less 
than the stipulated amount of his reasonable medical charges 
arising out of the subject collision, it is inequitable and 
manifestly unjust to then further reduce his recovery by the amount 
the tortfeasor's insurance company is obligated to pay to the 
victim's no-fault carrier. Not only is it unjust and inequitable, 
it is contrary to the pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court on 
this issue to reduce the victim's recovery twice, first by the 
jury's verdict awarding him less than the stipulated reasonable 
medical charges incurred as a result of defendant's negligence, and 
then again by reducing the judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed related issues in Allstate 
Ins. Co, v, Ivie, 608 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980), in which a predecessor 
statute to the current no-fault insurance code was at issue. In 
Ivie, the Court held, where there has been a payment by a no-fault 
insurer to the tort victim, "[i]n order to present a completely 
factual picture to the jury, the injured party may wish to present 
evidence of all his medical bills or other economic losses." This 
procedure was followed here, both by presentation of evidence 
regarding plaintiff's damages and medical bills, as well as by jury 
instruction number 11, which informed the jury that: 
The stipulated facts are as follows: 
$7,815.00 incurred in accident related medical expenses. 
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take these 
facts as true for purposes of this case. (R. 174). 
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The Ivie Court further held that the proper procedure in such a 
case is for 
The court, by an appropriate instruction, ... [to] 
explain to the jury that these economic losses have not 
been included in the prayer for damages, because the 
injured party has previously received reparation under 
his own no-fault insurance coverage. Ivie at 1200. 
Clearly, this procedure was not followed in the instant case, as 
the plaintiff did pray for the full amount of his medical bills, 
and no instruction was given informing the jury that a portion of 
the medical bills had been paid previously. 
The Ivie Court also held, however, that the substantially 
similar predecessor statute to the current no-fault law did not 
confer "on the no-fault insurer a right of subrogation to the funds 
received by its insured for personal injuries." Id. at 1202. 
Rather, the Court held, the law 
grants the no-fault insurer a limited, equitable right to 
seek reimbursement in arbitration proceeding against the 
liability insurer. [The no-fault law] cannot be deemed 
as conferring subrogation rights on the no-fault insurer, 
vis-a-vis its insured as to his recovery in a settlement 
or legal action. [Emphasis added]. Id. 
Yet despite this clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court that the 
matter of subrogation for no-fault benefits is between the 
liability insurer and the no-fault insurer only, and is not to 
involve the tort victim, defendant is trying to do precisely what 
the Ivie Court forbade — bring the no-fault insured, the 
plaintiff, into the matter and make him ultimately responsible for 
the subrogation. 
The confusion in this case is understandable, because the 
facts of this case are slightly different than those in Ivie. 
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Here, despite the pronouncement of the Ivie Court, the trial court 
allowed plaintiff to prove and plead for, and in fact submit to the 
jury as stipulated, the full amount of his medical benefits (minus 
an amount which the court determined, prior to trial, did not 
represent necessary medical care arising from the collision). 
Despite this proof, however, the jury deducted from its award 
for plaintifffs medical bill some $3,815, in that it awarded only 
$4,000, while the stipulated reasonable medical charges arising 
from this collision totaled $7,815. In essence, the jury, whether 
by serendipity or because of some knowledge obtained independently 
of any instruction from the court, deducted from the stipulated 
reasonable and necessary medical bills an amount greater than the 
PIP payments which defendant now attempts to have deducted from the 
verdict amount. 
The net effect of the jury's reduction of plaintiff's medical 
bills and the trial court's grant of defendant's requested PIP set-
off is that plaintiff will recover only $1,000 for his medical 
damages caused by defendant's negligence, when, by agreement and 
stipulation between the parties the full value of such damages 
totaled $7,815. Far from a double recovery, plaintiff is being 
twice penalized, in that the jury reduced his recovery by $3,815, 
and the trial court further reduced this amount by $3,000. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Laub v. 
South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), a 
case with a great deal of factual similarity to the instant 
dispute. In Laub, the trial court allowed plaintiff to plead for 
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amounts previously paid by the no-fault insurer. The jury in Laub, 
however, awarded the full amount of the medical damages, including 
those amounts previously paid as PIP coverage, to the plaintiff. 
The no-fault insurer, recognizing it had no right to proceed 
against its insured, after the holding in Ivie, sought and obtained 
recovery of the PIP amounts from the tortfeasor's insurer. The 
tortfeasor's insurer, after satisfying the full amount of the 
verdict by two checks, one to the tort victim and his no-fault 
insurer jointly for the PIP amount, and one to the tort victim 
individually for the remainder of the judgment, attempted by a Rule 
60(b) motion, to reduce the judgment against them by the amount of 
the PIP payment. Id. at 1305-1306. 
The principle differences between the Laub case and the 
instant dispute are: 1. the fact that the plaintiff recovered from 
the jury the full amount of his damages, including medical bills 
previously paid by PIP; and 2. the procedural posture of Laub, in 
that the defendant first satisfied the judgment, then, when ordered 
by an arbitrator to repay the no-fault insurer, attempted to reduce 
the already satisfied judgment. In the case now before this Court, 
the plaintiff did not receive the full amount of his stipulated 
reasonable and necessary medical bills incurred as a result of the 
collision caused by defendant, and the defendant followed a more 
procedurally correct course of attempting to resolve the PIP set-
off dispute before satisfying the judgment. 
Defendant relies on Laub for the proposition that 
if a plaintiff does improperly plead for previously 
compensated damages and they are allowed to be included 
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in the judgment, the court should, at the conclusion of 
the trial, either on its own initiative or on motion of 
a party, reduce the judgment by the amount of those 
previously compensated damages, and thereby prevent 
double recovery. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 1307. 
Because of the distinctions noted above, though, particularly the 
fact that the plaintiff here did not recover the full amount of his 
stipulated medical damages, the holding of the Laub Court is 
inapposite here. The key language in the passage cited above is 
that the judgment is to be reduced "by the amount of those 
previously compensated damages, and thereby prevent double 
recovery." Here, the verdict did not award plaintiff amounts for 
which he had been "previously compensated," because the jury 
reduced his stipulated reasonable medical bills incurred as a 
result of the collision by more than the amount of PIP payments he 
had received. By the same logic, then, there has been no "double 
recovery," because plaintiff's recovery has been reduced by more 
than the amount of his PIP payments. It naturally follows that 
defendant has already, by the jury's verdict, received his "set-
off," and the trial court improperly allowed him a second "set-
off," which plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to return to 
him. 
The clearest pronouncement by the Utah Supreme Court on this 
issue came in Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), in which 
the Court held that 
To the extent that plaintiff would receive double 
recovery of a particular type of damage, an adjustment of 
the judgment in this case was appropriate. However, the 
j udgment may only be reduced to the extent it 
specifically and identifiably included special damages of 
the same types as those for which no-fault benefits had 
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previously been received. [Emphasis added]. Id. at 686-
687. 
Here, there is no dispute that, by the jury's verdict, plaintiff's 
damages have been reduced by more than the amount of the PIP 
payments he has received. He has not received "double recovery of 
a particular type of damage." To the contrary, he received less 
than his stipulated reasonable medical damages resulting from 
defendant's negligence minus the PIP payments. To again reduce his 
damages is to violate the Court's directive in Dupuis. Such double 
reduction has the effect of reducing his judgment beyond "the 
extent [to which] it specifically and identifiably included special 
damages of the same types as those for which no-fault benefits had 
previously been received." For this reason, the decision of the 
trial court is in error, and must be reversed. 
The result sought by plaintiff does not violate Hill v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), in which the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that 
When the amount of damages incurred by the insured has 
been judicially ascertained, the extent of the 
subrogation right of the insurer is usually undisputed. 
The insured is not entitled to double recovery, and the 
[no-fault] insurer is equitably entitled to recover any 
amounts from the insured that the insured recovered from 
the tort-feasor. [Emphasis added]. Id. at 866. 
It is important that the Hill Court stated that where the damages 
have been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation 
right "is usually undisputed," and that the insured is not entitled 
to "double recovery." The instant dispute is one of the rare cases 
in which, even after judicial ascertainment of the amount of 
damages, the extent of the no-fault insurer's subrogation right to 
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plaintiff's recovery is disputed, because the judicial 
ascertainment of damages fell far short of the agreed, stipulated 
amount of damages actually suffered by plaintiff. For this reason, 
there is no chance that plaintiff will receive a "double recovery." 
Consequently, the trial court erred in further reducing plaintiff's 
award, and plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
this error. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order allowing a 
PIP set-off of $3,000 from the judgment amount, because: 
1. The jury failed to award the full amount of plaintiff's 
stipulated medical damages arising from defendant's negligence, but 
rather reduced the amount by $3,815; 
2. Plaintiff will not receive a "double recovery," because 
his damages have already been reduced by the jury's award; 
3. Defendant will not have to pay the amount of the PIP 
subrogation twice, because the jury has already reduced the amount 
of plaintiff's medical damages by more than the PIP subrogation 
amount; 
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4. It would be inequitable, unjust, and contrary to Utah 
law, as stated in the Utah Code and by decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court, to twice reduce plaintiff's recovery. 
Respectfully submitted this I J- day of November, 1993. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
ki 
John Farrell Fay 
Jim Mouritsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Winton Aposhian 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that four copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully prepaid, 
this day of November, 1993, to: 
T.J. Tsakalos 
CONDER, WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
hi 
Jim Mouritsen 
13 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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John Farrell Fay - (Bar No. 5691) 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-0999 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WINTON APOSHIAN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STEVE QUIMBY, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
STIPULATION TO SUMMARY 
OF MEDICAL CHARGES 
C i v i l NO. 920900339 PI 
Judge Richard M o f f a t 
oooOooo 
The above-named parties, through their respective 
counsel, .iiereby stipulate that '"the smnmary-of--plaintiff '.s -medical 
charges (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit WA") represent 
reasonable charges for medical services plaintiff Winton Aposhian 
incurred as a result of the subject collision, and that these 
amounts may be entered into evidence without the need of further 
foundation. 
DATED this IS. +Ar day of January, 1993. 
S:&S3iaSR£ES .& JENSEN 
DATED this IL day of 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
^ 9 n f 
EXHIBIT "B" 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
Before the trial of this case, the Court held a conference with the lawyers for the parties. 
At this conference, the parties entered into certain stipulations or agreements, in which they 
agreed that facts could be taken as trae without further proof. By this procedure, it is often 
possible to save much time. 
The stipulated facts are as follows: 
$7,815.00 incurred in accident related medical expenses. 
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take these facts as true for purposes of this 
case. 
EXHIBIT "C" 
16 
T. J. TSAKALOS (3289) 
Of CONDER, WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WINTON APOSHIAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 1 
STEVE QUIMBY, 1 
Defendant. 
1 ORDER 
I Civil 
I Judge 
REGARDING SET-OFF 
No. 93^ 0900339 PI 
Richard Moffat 
The defendant's Motion for Set-off coming before the court 
for hearing of April 9, 1993, John Farrell Fay, appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiff and T. J. Tsakalos, appearing on behalf of 
the defendant, and the court having reviewed the memorandum filed 
by counsel and hearing oral argument of counsel, 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES THAT: 
Defendant's Motion for Set-Off is granted and the verdict and 
ultimate judgment will be reduced by $3,000.00, representing the 
P.I.P. subrogation claim of State Farm Insurance, the insurer for 
~hirci Judicial District 
MAY - 6 1993 
r\ O n O 
plaintiff. 71)^** 
DATED this day of 1993. 
^^-rt^^J-' 
ard Moffat \^^ ><Ll I 
Court Judge.?fec7^ / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /$ day of April, 1993, I 
mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING 
SET-OFF, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John Farrell Fay 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
&u£ 
